Here are a few basic attacks on RSA which may be used if the implementation is sloppy. In the real world things like this are accounted for but even so these give us some insight as to why we can’t be sloppy.

1. **Common Modulus Attack**

   Suppose Bob1 and Bob2 choose the same modulus but coincidentally choose coprime encryption exponents. Thus we have \((n, e_1)\) and \((n, e_2)\) with \(\gcd(e_1, e_2) = 1\).

   (a) Alice wants to send \(P\) to both of them so she sends \(C_1 \equiv P^{e_1} \mod n\) to Bob1 and \(C_2 \equiv P^{e_2} \mod n\) to Bob2.

   (b) Suppose Eve gets ahold of both \(C_1\) and \(C_2\).

   (c) Since \(\gcd(e_1, e_2) = 1\) she can find \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) with \(\alpha e_1 + \beta e_2 = 1\) and then she can find \(P\) via:

   \[
   C_1^\alpha C_2^\beta \equiv (P^{e_1})^\alpha (P^{e_2})^\beta \equiv P^{\alpha e_1 + \beta e_2} \equiv P^1 \equiv P \mod n
   \]

2. **Hastad Broadcast Attack**

   This generalizes but the simple version is to suppose that Bob1, Bob2, and Bob3 each use encryption exponent \(e = 3\) because they want encryption to be fast with a low power but they use pairwise coprime moduli \(n_1\), \(n_2\), and \(n_3\).

   (a) Alice wants to send \(P\) to all three of them so she sends \(C_1 \equiv P^3 \mod n_1\) to Bob1, \(C_2 \equiv P^3 \mod n_2\) to Bob2, and \(C_3 \equiv P^3 \mod n_2\) to Bob3.

   (b) Suppose Eve gets ahold of all of \(C_1\), \(C_2\), and \(C_3\). She then considers the following system:

   \[
   \begin{align*}
   x &\equiv C_1 \equiv P^3 \mod n_1 \\
   x &\equiv C_2 \equiv P^3 \mod n_2 \\
   x &\equiv C_3 \equiv P^3 \mod n_3
   \end{align*}
   \]

   She can use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to solve this and then find the least non-negative residue \(x \mod n_1 n_2 n_3\). She then knows that \(x \equiv P^3 \mod n_1 n_2 n_3\).

   (c) However \(P < n_1\), \(P < n_2\) and \(P < n_3\) so in fact \(P^3 < n_1 n_2 n_3\) and so \(P^3 = x\) and so \(P = \sqrt[3]{x}\).

3. **Interception/Resend Attack**

   Suppose Bob uses public key \((n, e)\) and private key \((n, d)\).

   (a) Alice wants to send \(P\) to Bob so she sends \(C \equiv P^e \mod n\).

   (b) Eve intercepts this \(C\). Of course she can’t read it but instead she chooses some \(r\) with \(\gcd(r, n) = 1\) and sends \(\bar{C} \equiv Cr^e \mod n\) on to Bob.

   (c) Bob receives \(\bar{C}\) and attempts to decrypt it, finding:

   \[
   (\bar{C})^d \equiv (Cr^e)^d \equiv (P^e r^e)^d \equiv P^{ed} r^{ed} \equiv Pr \mod n
   \]

   Which looks like garbage to him so he throws it in the trash.

   (d) Eve retrieves it and multiplies by \(r^{-1}\) to get \(P\).