

1. (20 points = 10+10) (a) H has collisions because $H(x+p) = H(x)$. But H is preimage resistant: Given y , it is hard to find any z with $h(z) = y$. In particular, it is hard to find z with $0 \leq z < p$ with $h(z) = y$.
- (b) The line through the points is $y \equiv 3x - 1$. We need to solve $(3x - 1)^2 \equiv x^3 + 3x$, which can be changed to $x^3 - 9x^2 + \dots \equiv 0$. Then 9 is the sum of the roots: $9 \equiv 1 + 2 + x$, so $x = 6$. Then $y \equiv 3x - 1 \equiv 6$. Reflect across the x -axis to get $(6, -6)$, or $(6, 5)$.
2. (20 points = 10+10) (a) Peggy chooses any two values of r_1 and r_2 , computes $y_1 \equiv g^{r_1}$ and $y_2 \equiv g^{r_2}$. Then she follows the given procedure.
- (b) Between 2 and 3, Victor needs to check that $y_1 y_2 \equiv h$.
3. (25 points = 10+10+5) (a) There are $N = 2^{100} \approx 10^{30}$ "birthdays" and $r = 10^{10}$ people. The probability of a match is approximately $1 - e^{-r^2/2N} \approx 1 - e^{-5 \times 10^{-11}} \approx 0.00$.
- (b) Eve makes two lists: (1) $D_{L_1}(D_{L_1}(c))$ for all keys L_1 , (2) $E_{L_2}(E_{L_2}(m))$ for all keys L_2 . A match yields a desired pair (L_1, L_2) . (A birthday attack could be used to make the lists shorter.)
- (c) For these two choices of keys for DES (but not for most cryptosystems), encryption and decryption are the same, so $E_{K_2}(E_{K_2}(m)) = m$ and similarly for K_1 . Therefore, the ciphertext equals the plaintext, so Eve doesn't need any attack to read future messages.
4. (35 points = 10+10+5+10) (a) $h^{m_r r} \equiv g^{am} g^{kr} \equiv g^{am+kr} \equiv g^s$.
- (b) Eve needs to solve $g^{s_1} \equiv h^{m_1} 2015^{2015} \pmod{p}$. This is a discrete log problem, therefore probably hard. (Note: Eve does not need to produce s_1 by the formula, so the fact she does not know k and a is not necessarily relevant. She only needs to find s_1 that satisfies the verification equation.)
- (c) $s \equiv aH(m) + kr$, $g^s \equiv h^{H(m)r}$.
- (d) $R = kP = (x, y)$, and $s \equiv am + kx \pmod{n}$, where n is the number of points on E ; Verification: $sP = mQ + xR$.