

1. (15 points = 6+3+6) **(a)** The inverse of 21 mod 26 is 5. Multiply by 5 to get  $5y \equiv 105x + 10 \equiv x + 10 \pmod{26}$ . This yields  $x \equiv 5y - 10$ . The decryption of  $W = 22$  is  $5 \times 22 - 10 = 100 \equiv 22$ , which is  $X$ . The decryption of  $A = 0$  is  $-10 \equiv 16$ , which is  $Q$ . So my plaintext is  $XQ$ .

**(b)** The determinant of the matrix is  $-2$  and  $\gcd(-2, 26) \neq 1$ , so the matrix is not invertible.

**(c)** Since  $2554^2 \equiv 3^{2700} \equiv 1 \pmod{2701}$  and  $2554 \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{2701}$ , we compute  $\gcd(2554 - 1, 2701) = 37$ , so  $2701 = 37 \times 73$ .

2. (15 points) Let  $P$  be the one-time pad. Double encrypting  $m$  yields  $m \oplus P \oplus P = m$  since  $p \oplus P = 000 \dots 0$ . The key  $NANANA$  alternates shifts of 13 and 0. Doing this twice yields shifts of 26 and 0. Since we are working mod 26, the plaintext does not get encrypted. Finally, since  $e^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ , we must have  $d = e$ . Therefore, double encryption is the same as encrypting and then decrypting. The final result is therefore the unencrypted plaintext.

3. (15 points = 10+5) **(a)** We have  $c_4 \equiv m^{e_A d_A e_B d_B} \equiv (m^{e_A d_A})^{e_B d_B} \equiv m^{e_A d_A} \pmod{n}$ , since raising to the exponent  $e_B d_B$  is RSA encryption and decryption for Bob. But  $m^{e_A d_A} \equiv m \pmod{n}$  since this is RSA encryption and decryption for Alice. Therefore,  $c_4 \equiv m \pmod{n}$ .

**(b)** Knowing  $e_A$  and  $d_A$  allows Eve to factor  $n$ , so then Eve solves  $d_B e_B \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$  for  $d_B$  for get  $d_A$ .

4. (10 points = 5+5) **(a)** To find  $y$ , Nelson will need to find square roots mod  $n$ . This is equivalent to being able to factoring  $n$ .

**(b)** First choose the point  $P = (x, y)$  and the coefficient  $A$ . Then let  $B = y^2 - x^3 - Ax$ .

5. (15 points = 5+5+5) **(a)** Eve needs to solve  $s^e \equiv 123456789 \pmod{n}$ , which is the same as decrypting the RSA “ciphertext” 123456789 to get the “plaintext”  $s$ . This is (probably) hard to do.

**(b)** Eve computes  $m \equiv 112090305^e \pmod{n}$ . Then  $(m, s)$  satisfies the verification congruence.

**(c)** Eve needs to solve  $g^m \equiv r^s h^r \pmod{p}$  for  $m$ . Since  $g$  is a primitive root, this always has a solution. It is a discrete log problem, so it is (probably) hard.

6. (15 points = 5+5+5) **(a)** Victor checks that  $Y_1 + Y_2 = Q$ .

**(b)** Victor checks that  $r_i P = Y_i$ .

**(c)** They repeat (1) through (6) ten times.

7. (15 points = 5+5+5) **(a)** There are  $N = 3 \times 10^{147}$  “birthdays” and  $r = 10^{85}$  “people.” Since  $r$  is much larger than  $\sqrt{N}$ , it is very likely that there is a match; that is, two particles should choose the same prime.

**(b)**  $h$  is fast. But  $h(m) = m$ , so it is not preimage resistant, and  $h(m \oplus m \oplus m) = h(m)$ , so it is not collision resistant.

**(c)** Eve makes  $2^{30}$  versions of the petition and computes their hashes. She makes  $2^{30}$  versions of the statement and computes their hashes. Since  $h$  has at most  $2^{60}$  outputs and  $2^{30} = \sqrt{2^{60}}$ , we expect a match between the two lists of hashes:  $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$ , where  $m_1$  is a version of the petition and  $m_2$  is a version of the statement. Eve has Alice sign  $m_1$  by signing  $H(m_1)$ . This is also a signature for  $m_2$ .