
Pedestrian macroscopic models: game-theoretical versus mechanistic viewpoints

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1. Issues & context
2. The Heuristic-Based Model (HBM)
3. Mean-field models
4. Macroscopic model
5. Relation to game theory
6. Conclusion

1. Issues & context

Safety

Avoid crowd disasters


e.g. Duisburg love parade

Cambodia water festival

Demonstration control

Design, comfort, efficiency

Terminals, shopping malls, etc.



Individual-Based Models (IBM)

Each individual followed in time

Social force model [Helbing & Molnar, Phys. Rev. E51, 1995]



Analogy with physics:

Attractive/repulsive forces

others ...

Cellular automata


[Burstetde et al, Physica A 295, 2001]



Macroscopic models

Inspired by gas kinetics

[Henderson, Transp. Res. 8, 1974]



Static/dynamic field (\sim chemotaxis)

[Hughes et al, Transp. Res. B36, 2002]







Inspired from road traffic

[Colombo et al, MMAS 28, 2005]



2. The Heuristic-Based Model (HBM)

[Moussaïd, Helbing, Theraulaz, PNAS 2011]




Pedestrians have constant speed

Evaluation assumes pedestrians move on straight lines


Distance to Interaction (DTI)

Minimal Distance (MD)



In case of multiple encounters

Take the minimal DTI




Nash equilibrium: Discrete time step

New cruising direction u' chosen such that

Estimation $X_E(u')$ minimizes distance to target X_T

$$\|X_E(w) - X_T\|^2 \text{ among test directions } w$$



Motion capture system

Sensors reflect infra-red light

Reflection point camera recorded

Triangulation \rightarrow coordinates

Circular arena


Avoids boundary effects



Lane formation

Lane definition


by clustering method



Cluster lifetime statistics

$p(t)dt$ = probability that lifetime $\in [t, t + dt]$

Stretched exponential $p(t) = p_0 e^{at^k}$, $k = 0.4$



In insert: results of model (See [Moussaid et al, PlosCB 2012])

N Particles (pedestrians) $i = 1, \dots, N$

Position $x_i(t)$, velocity $u_i(t)$, Target direction $a_i(t)$

with $|u_i(t)| = 1$, $|a_i(t)| = 1$, i.e. $u_i, a_i \in \mathbb{S}^1$

$$\dot{x}_i = cu_i,$$

$$du_i = F_i dt + P_{u_i^\perp}(\sqrt{2d} \circ dB_i(t))$$

Speed c , noise intensity d , Stratonowich sense \circ

Force $F_i \perp u_i$, $P_{u_i^\perp}$ maintains $|u_i| = 1$

Test velocity directions $w \in \mathbb{S}^1 \rightarrow$ Potential $\Phi_i(w, t)$

$$\Phi_i(w, t) = \frac{k}{2} |D_i(w)w - La_i|^2$$

Reaction rate k , horizon L

$D_i(w)$ maximal walkable distance in direction w


Force $F_i(t)$ defined by steepest descent of Φ_i

$$F_i(t) = -\nabla_w \Phi_i(u_i(t), t)$$

DTI of 'i' against 'j' when 'i' walks in direction w : $D_{ij}(w)$

$$D_i(w) = \text{"min"}_j D_{ij}(w)$$

For continuum model, replace 'min' by average
 e.g. harmonic average in some interaction region



3. The Mean-Field Model

Distribution function $f(x, u, a, t)$ $x \in \mathbb{R}^2$, $u, a \in \mathbb{S}^1$

Probability to find pedestrians at x

with velocity u and target velocity a at time t

$$\partial_t f + \nabla_x \cdot (cu f) + \nabla_u \cdot (F f) = d\Delta_u f$$

$$F = -\nabla_w \Phi_{(x,a,t)}(u)$$

$$\Phi_{(x,a,t)}(w) = \frac{k}{2} |D_{(x,t)}(w) w - La|^2$$

$D_{(x,t)}(w)$ walkable distance of subject at x

in direction w : functional of f

Supposes interaction region "very small"

$$D_{(x,t)}^{-1}(w) = \frac{\int_{(v,b) \in \mathbb{T}^2} \Delta(|v - w|) f(x, v, b, t) dv db}{\int_{(v,b) \in \mathbb{T}^2} f(x, v, b, t) dv db}$$

where Δ is analytically known (related to the DTI)

If blind zone, $\Delta = \Delta(u, |v - w|)$

Then $D = D_{(x,u,t)}(x)$ and $\Phi = \Phi_{(x,u,a,t)}(w)$

Dependence of Φ on u problematic

Subsequent macroscopic theory cannot be developed

Other closures can be done

4. Macroscopic model

Let $D(u)$ be arbitrary and define

$$Q_D(f) = -\nabla_u \cdot (F_D f) + d\nabla_u f$$

$$F_D(u, a) = -\nabla_u \Phi_D(u, a), \quad \Phi_D(u, a) = \frac{k}{2} |D(u) u - La|^2$$

For $f(u, a)$ arbitrary, define

$$D_f^{-1}(u) = \frac{\int_{(v,b) \in \mathbb{T}^2} \Delta(|v - u|) f(v, b) dv db}{\int_{(v,b) \in \mathbb{T}^2} f(x, v, b, t) dv db}$$

Then mean-field model can be written

$$\partial_t f + \nabla_x \cdot (cuf) = \frac{1}{\varepsilon} Q_{D_f}(f)$$

'Generalized' Von-Mises (GVM) distributions²²

For given $D(u)$, solutions f of $Q_D(f) = 0$ are of the form


$$f(u, a) = \rho(a) M_D(u, a)$$

with $\rho(a)$ arbitrary and

$$M_D(u, a) = \frac{1}{Z_D(a)} \exp\left(-\frac{\Phi_D(u, a)}{d}\right)$$

where $Z_D(a)$ is s.t.

$$\int M_D(u, a) du = 1$$



Solutions f of $Q_{D_f}(f) = 0$:

are GVM $f = \rho(a) M_D(u, a)$

such that $D = D_{\rho M_D}$

Leads to a fixed point equation

$$D^{-1}(u) = \frac{\int_{(v,b) \in \mathbb{T}^2} \Delta(|v - u|) \rho(b) M_D(v, b) dv db}{\int_{(v,b) \in \mathbb{S}^1} \rho(b) db}$$

Mathematical theory open

Here we assume that for any function $\rho(a)$:

there exists a 'distinguished' solution D_ρ

When $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$, formally we have

$$f^\varepsilon \rightarrow \rho_{(x,t)}(a) M_{D_{\rho_{(x,t)}}}(u, a)$$

where $\rho_{(x,t)}(a)$ satisfies the continuity eq.

$$\partial_t \rho_{(x,t)}(a) + \nabla_x \cdot (c \rho_{(x,t)}(a) U_{\rho_{(x,t)}}(a)) = 0$$

and $U_{\rho_{(x,t)}}(a)$ is the mean equilibrium velocity

$$U_\rho(a) = \int_{u \in \mathbb{S}^1} M_{D_\rho}(u, a) u \, du$$

5. Relation to game theory

Spatially homogeneous case:

For probability $f(u, a)$, introduce the 'cost function'

$$\mu_f(u, a) = \Phi_{D_f}(u, a) + d \ln f(u, a)$$

Non-cooperative anonymous game with a continuum of players (aka 'Mean-Field Game [Lasry & Lions])

each pedestrian (player) tries to minimize its cost by acting on its own decision variable u

f_{NE} is a Nash Equilibrium if

No player can reduce its cost by acting on its control variable u

f_{NE} is a Nash Equilibrium iff $\exists K$ s.t.

$$\mu_{f_{\text{NE}}}(u, a) = K, \quad \forall (u, a) \in \text{Supp}(f_{\text{NE}})$$

$$\mu_{f_{\text{NE}}}(u, a) \geq K, \quad \forall (u, a) \in \mathbb{T}^2$$

The following statements are equivalent:

f is an equilibrium of the kinetic model

and is therefore a GVM distribution

f is a Nash Equilibrium for the Mean-Field Game

defined by cost function μ_f

Spatially inhomogeneous case

Hydrodynamic model is obtained by

Taking the continuity equation (i.e. taking the first moment of kinetic eq. wrt u)

Closing the model by taking the local Nash Equilibrium

See a general framework for

Kinetic models coupled with Mean-Field Games in

[D., Liu, Ringhofer, A Nash equilibrium macroscopic closure for kinetic models coupled with Mean-Field Games, arXiv:1212.6130

6. Conclusion

Heuristic-Based model of Moussaïd, Helbing Theraulaz

Takes into account following behavior

Derivation of

Time continuous IBM

potential minimization replaced by steepest descent

Mean-Field Model

approximation of local interactions, no blind zone

Hydrodynamic Model

Equilibria can be interpreted as

Nash equilibria of a Mean-Field Game

View of pedestrians as fully rational agents

≠ mechanistic view of most models